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FORCIBLE SELF-HELP
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
James J- McHugh
INTRODUCTION
The Problcm of Force in Intcrnational Relations_ The proper use of
force has historically been a preeminent
concern of mankind. In the domestic
environment the progress of centuries
has evidenced the development of a
highly structured order for the appropriate application of this means of coercion. Societies, bound together by common heritage and a community of
interest, have, under the central authority of the state, developed regulations for the use of force covering a
broad spectrum of situational hypotheses.
But even in domestic society, significant deb~te has arisen as to the proper
application oC force. Thus, in the cur-

rent milieu in the United States, we
have wi tnessed discussions on the
morality of capital punishment and the
legitimacy of measures of private coercion such as sit-ins and mass demonstrations.
If domestic societies can still debate
the appropriate application of force
internally, how much more difficult is
the solution of problems surrounding
the use of force in the international
community. V{ith a multiplicity of
sovereign nation-states prosecuting their
separate national interests and with no
central authority to manage the expression of these frequen tly competing interests, it is perhaps a testament to the
basic rationality of the human species
that man has not long since destroyed
himself.
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And yet he has not. Through centuries of cataclysm and accommodation,
states have managed, although sometimes just barely, to preserve at least a
semblance of order, even in circumstances of great disorder, by developing
minimum standards for the proper application of force. 1 This essentially neutral energy has been all-pervasive in
international relations and very frequently misused, but concern for its
utilization has always been present, and
it is this concern which prevails as a
bulwark against the challenge of chaos.
The Current Conundrum. The experience of the last 50 years has greatly
heightened the preoccupation of nations
with the application of force. World
Wars I and II have seemingly convinced
men and nat\ons that at least the unilateral use of armed force by states
should be foresworn; that its application
should be surrendered to a central
authority whose dispassion and objectivity, hopefully, could be counted on
to at once reduce the chances that force
would be resorted to and carefully
circumscribe the mode of its application
when required.
At both Versailles and San Francisco,
men of goodwill attempted to create
such an authority: in the latter case
with an even greater sense of urgency
than in the former. By 1945 the nations
of the world had witnessed the horror of
two World Wars and the advent of
atomic power, and they were fully
convinced that the control of force had
become a sine qua non for the continued existence of mankind.
Viewed from the perspective of
1972, however, it can be stated that in
large measure the United Nations has
failed to minimize the use of armed
force. It is true that in the past 27 years
there has been no worldwide conflagration; but there have been many lesser
but very bloody conflicts and, by aod
large, only the residual horror remaining
from 1945 and the universal fear of an

apocalypse of thermonuclear power
have kept leashed the dogs of world
war.
The reasons for the failure of the
United Nations to control the use of
force are to be found both in the
environment of its birth and the character of its principal legislative instrument.
The U.N. was created during a period of
temporary consensus as a reflection of
the chaotic upheaval of World War II.
As a result there was enacted in its
charter a body of aspirational international law which depended for its effectiveness on the continued consensus of
the Great Powers of the world. The
United Nations had en esse arrogated to
itself the competence to use armed
force to redress wrongs; but when the
Great Power consensus evaporated, this
competence became a nUllity.2
This is the conundrum that has
plagued the nations of the world ever
since: the riddle of an organization with
authority and no power; the paradox
of a world where states have rights but
have ostensibly foresworn their remedies to an institution that, by and large,
can insure no redress for wrongs; the
need to honor an instrument which has
become, for many states, the supreme
law of the land while at the same time
recognizing that full honor and complete compliance with the spirit and
even the letter of that instrument are
beyond the capability of sovereign
states with conflicting and often selfish
national interests.
State Response. Construing their actions most charitably, it can be stated
that in the face of this dilemma the
several states of the United Nations have
done the best they could to strike an
accommodation between the mandates
of the charter and the requirements of
their own national interests. Ry and
l,tl"ge, they have Cldhered to the principle
that armed force can no longer be
justified simply as an instrument of
national policy and that armed aggres·
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sion, whatever its precise meaning, is a
criminal act. However, states have continued, in practice, to resort to the use
of armed force. They have employed
traditional measures of forcible self-help
short of war and have attempted to
justify this action on the basis of the
charter, and too often this has become
purely a game of semantics. 4
Such a modus operandi would not
necessarily bode ill for the creation of a
body of regulations for the realistic
management of international force. It
could even be envisaged as a dev.elopment somewhat parallel to that experienced in the United States and Great
Britain where common law evolved both
under and together with constitutional
instruments. However, with no central
authority for enforcement and no compulsory jurisdiction to achieve objective
interpretation, a distinct pattern of
developing legitimate/illegitimate state
practice is difficult to discern. If a body
of international law on forcible self-help
is emerging under the charter, it is more
a random happenstance than a considered development by dispassionate
and objective judicial ratiocination.
Result of SLate Response. The state
response of employing measures of
forcible self-help and then attempting to
rationalize them under the charter has
led to considerable confusion. Tortuous
legal reasoning has been applied to
justify actions clearly beyond the pale
of the charter. 5 Inconsistent Security
Council reaction has elaborated the confusion,6 and finally, the dearth of judicial pronouncements has compounded
matters even further by precluding any
real development of authoritative precedent.?
As a consequence, frustration and
cynicism have grown apace. Both decisionmakers and scholars have frequently fa1len victim to one or the other
of these twin devils. It has been contended that the use of force is an area
beyond the competence of international

law, that in the absence of a true
international consensus the control of
force must remain in a legal no man's
land. 8 It has even been advanced that
the function of international law in the
control of force is simply to provide the
best possible justification for political
acts and in no way is it relevant as a
consideration in the development of
policy. 9
Along with these counsels of despair,
however, there is in evidence a growing
realism concerning the appropriate function of the law in the application of
force by states under the charter: a
realism which neither admits of irrelevancy nor pretends to omnipotence but
rather seeks the middle ground between
"the Charybdis of subservience to state
ambitions and the Scylla of excessive
pretensions of restraint." 1 0
This school of realism views the
world as seeking at least a minimum
public order and conservation of human
values and perceives the function of the
law as a process of decision making to
the achievement of this end. 11 Rigid
concepts of legality and illegality in the
application of force, particularly in the
absence of compUlsory jurisdiction, are
viewed as distinctly unhelpful. Rather,
empirical norms are sought which will
provide at least a modest body of
consensual regulation, and as the habit
of consensus grows, so will the law. It is
contended that state conduct should be
justified or condemned on the basis of
its rationality and restraint under all the
circumstances, rather than on the basis
of how said conduct comports with an
arbitrary standard of legality which does
not possess consensual content.
The net result of this approach does
not afford the law as exalted a position
in the order of international hierarchy
as some might desire, but its proponents
would contend that vis-a-vis the use of
force, international society is primitive
at best, and if the law is to thrive in
such an environment it must not aspire
to more than it can achieve. 12
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Purposc of This Essay_ With this
concept in mind, the present essay will
consider that mode of force to which
states have frequently resorted since
1945, i.e., forcible self-help, and attempt to elucidate some practical criteria which decisionmakers might apply
in a situational context to determine
whether a proposed use of force is
legitimate. To do this it will be helpful
to first examine the customary law of
forcible self-help as it existed prior to
the U.N. Charter. Next, the proscriptions and prescriptions of the charter
will be considered and, subsequently,
state practice under the charter, Security Council actions in response to the
use of force, such judicial decisions as
exist, and authoritative commentary in
the area.
Hopefully, ilrom this analysis it will
be possible to indicate certain state
conduct which is clearly legitimate and
other activity which is equally clearly
subject to condemnation. Between these
poles there will obviously be a broad
gray area, but it is in this area that
certain inchoate normative conduct may
be discernible which can provide a
suggested pattern for decisionmaking
with a high order of probability that the
use of force in a given instance can be
legitimated.
It should be noted that the emphasis
throughout is on measures of forcible
self-help, forcible in the sense that
armed force is applied or threatened.
The numerous other means of coercion
utilized in international relations, while
of considerable significance in international law, must of necessity be relegated to a position of incidental reference in the current undertaking.
Whether the effort to enunciate practical guidelines will be successful remains to be seen, but it is considered a
most necessary endeavor. There has
been much too much of the frustration
and cynicism referred to above. Decisionmakers have, with considerable justification, fre~uently thrown up their

hands after attempts to assay what
guidance the law offers in this area and
have fallen back on post-factum rationalization. And yet even this cynical
approach is a response to an intuitive
appreciation that the awesome power
which force can exhibit demands great
circumspection in its application. For as
Richard Falk has eloquently noted:
"Among the most profou~d quests of a
moral man is knowledge about the
proper use of force in human relations,
for force entails a wide range of claims
over life and death. As such it expresses
the limiting condition of mortality.,,13
THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FORCIBLE SELF-HELP
The Gcneral Nature of Forcible SelfHelp. Forcible self-help as a means of
coercion short of war is an ancient and
obvious principle to which societal communities have had frequent recourse in
the conduct of international relations.
As long ago as 431 B.C. a treaty
between the Mediterranean city-states
of Oeantheia and Chalaeum attempted
to regulate resort to this mode of
conduct.! 4
Self-help is, of course, the creature of
a decentralized society, be it national or
international. In the .course of history,
resort to self-help has waxed and waned
in relationship to the degree to which
society was integrated or diffused. Thus
the establishment of the Roman Empire
seems to have eliminated practices of
self-help in the territory under Roman
rule; again after the dissolution of the
Holy Roman Empire and the diminution of the power of the Pope self-help
flourished.! 5 In more recent times, the
full flowering of the nation-state system
with its accent on sovereign independence created a condition in international relations in which measures of
self-help were vital to the protection of
state interests.
Across this historical spectrum, while
the legitimacy of self-help was clearly
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recognized so were its inherent dangers,
and, accordingly, attempts to regulate
the means and methods of self-help have
been as consistently in evidence as the
instances of a recourse to the device. I 6
Out of this effort has developed a body
of international law which, with varying
degrees of success, has categorized and
defined legitimate measures of forcible
self-help and prescribed rules for their
utilization. Under the classical system of
international law, these measures could
be divided into three main legal categories: (a) self-defense, (b) reprisals, and
(c) intervention. I 7
Self-Defense. A state's right of selfdefense was considered paramount
under customary international law. And
yet a precise definition of this right is
difficult to\ discover. In the 19th century, statesmen and writers frequently
equated the right with a "right" of
self-preservation. I 8 Yet it has been
noted. that such a definition is so extensive as to destroy the imperative character of any system of law by making all
obligation to obey the law conditional.
It has been suggested that rather than
equating self-defense with self-preservation, it should be recognized that selfpreservation for both states and individuals is an instinct rather than a legal
right. While in a given situation the
instinct might prevail over a legal duty
not to do violence to others, a society
espousing any kind of order ought not
to admit that it is lawful for it to do
SO.19

The foregoing suggests that, in customary law, self-defense became recognized as a more limited right than that
enunciated in the 19th century. This
view is generally borne out by the
practice of states. At least after 1920
legitimate self-defense typically appears
in the context of the threat or use of
force. It was considered as a reaction to
imminent or actual violence rather than
as justified by any violation of the legal
rights of a state or of its subjects? 0

Probably the best statement of the
conditions for the exercise of selfdefense in customary international law
is the definition formulated even earlier
by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in
the Caroline incident. 2 I
In 1837 during an insurrection in
Canada, the steamer Caroline was being
used to transport to Canada men and
materials for the rebels from American
territory across the Niagara River. The
Government of the United States was
not p'reventing this activity, and, accordingly, a body of Canadian militia
crossed the Niagara into U.S. territory
and after a scuffle, in which some
American citizens were killed, sent the
Caroline over the falls. In the contention which followed, the issue was
raised as to whether the conditions for
the exercise of the right of self-defense
had been met. Webster formulated a test
which has since met with general acceptance. He noted that self·defense
must arise out of an instant and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of
means and no mcment for deliberation.
Additionally, the action taken must
involve nothing unreasonable or excessive "since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited
by that necessity and kept clearly
within it.,,22
The rule of the Caroline case was
subjected to some criticism on grounds,
inter alia, that the conditions it pronounced were somewhat vague. Be that
as it may, the case is generally recognized as an authoritative pronouncement of customary international law, 2 3
and if state practice is taken together
with the Caroline case, a reasonably
clear basis for the exercise of the customary right of self-defense emerges:
• Its exercise must be in response to
actual or threatened violence.
• The actual or threatened violence
must be of such a nature as to create an
instant and overwhelming necessity to
respond, and
• The response taken must not be
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excessive or unreasonable in relation to
the violence being inflicted or threatened_
Reprisals. While self-defense in customary international law can be viewed
as a reaction by states to violence being
inflicted or threatened by another state,
reprisal is a means of forcible self-help
to redress wrongs already inflicted. Selfdefense as a means of self-help is recognized in both international and domestic law. Reprisal is not. At least in
modem times, reprisal is unique to the
international arena. In domestic society
central authority is frequently unavailable to forestall the immediate threat of
force, and hence the doctrine of selfdefense has prevailed; but in the absence
of immediacy there are institutions and
methods in m~dern domestic society to
peacefully redress wrong, and hence
retaliatory self-help is not endorsed. 2 4
The first legal doctrine to emerge was
one involving private reprisals. In English practice acts of private reprisal first
made a significant appearance in the late
13th century. They were characterized,
typically, by the seizure of goods and
property on the high seas. By the late
15th and the 16th centuries, reprisals by
private seizure had become a generally
recognized method of forcible selfhelp.25
Private reprisals prevailed until the
18th century. During their existence
they had certain unchanging characteristics. They were authorized by the
sovereign of an individual against whom
an alleged crime had been committed
(generally robbery or failure to pay a
debt) by a subject or agent of another
state. Additionally, the legal right to
pursue reprisals rested upon the preexistence of a denial of justice. By this
was meant that redress had been sought
from the sovereign of the injuring party
but to no avail. Finally, retaliation was
to be had against the property and
people of the offending state for an
amount susceptible of expression in

pecuniary terms and equivalent to loss
plus reasonable costs? 6
In general, the practice of private
reprisals acquired a high degree of uniformity in international law. Regulation, both local and by treaty, carefully
channelized the evolving doctrine into a
fairly structured method of achieving
redress of certain amounts under controlled conditions. 2 7 Thus the potential
abuses of the system were kept reasonably in check. Occasionally, however,
when reprisals were used for political
purposes, as in wars of reprisal, they
departed from established norms and
became unpredictable. This unpredictability was the chief characteristic
of public reprisals, which superseded
private reprisals in the 18th century.
The distinguishing aspect of public
reprisals was the authorization of seizures as a punishment of the offending
state. They were carried out by states,
as opposed to individuals, and although
based on the notion of denial of justice
for a wrong committed, the wrong did
not have to be against any individual
person nor were the seizures limi ted by
any notions of loss plus costs. 2 8
Measures of reprisal commonly used
included: (a) embargo of the offending
state's ships found in the waters of the
wronged state, (b) seizure of the injuring state's ships on the high seas, and
(c) pacific blockade of the coasts of the
offending state against the ships of that
state. 29
In the Naulilaa arbitration of 192830
there appears the most authoritative
statement of the customary law of
reprisal. In October 1914, while Portugal was still neutral, a party from
German Southwest Africa entered Portuguese African territory. A misunderstanding arose due to the incompetence
of the German interpreter; shots were
fired, and a German official and two of
his officers were killed. By way of
reprisal, the Governor of German Southwest Africa sent a punitive force into
Portuguese territory. The force attacked
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several frontier posts and drove out the
garrison from Naulilaa. In the evacuated
area a native uprising occurred, the
suppression of which necessitated a considerable expedition by the Portuguese.
A special arbitral tribunal considered
Germany's responsibility for all that had
ensued. Germany contended that her
action was a legitimate reprisal. The
arbitrators rejected this plea. In so doing
they noted:
Reprisals are acts of self-help by
the injured State, acts in retaliation for acts contrary to international law on the part of the
offending State, which have remained unredressed after a demand for amends. In consequence
of such measures, the observance
of this or that rule of international lhw is temporarily suspended in the relations between
two States. They are limited by
considerations of humanity and
the rules of good faith, applicable
in the relations between States.
They are illegal unless they are
based upon a previous act contrary to international law. They
seek to impose on the offending
State reparation for the offence,
the return to legality and the
avoidance of new offences. 3 1
From this statement three conditions
for the legitimacy of reprisals in customary law can be discerned:
• There must have been an illegal act
on the part of the target state.
• Demand for redress must be made
and redress not provided, and
• The measures taken must not be
excessive, Le., out of all proportion to
the act which motivated them.
Quite obviously, the foregoing conditions did not provide a sure and certain
blueprint for taking legitimate reprisals
in any given case. There were questions
as to whether demand for redress must
always be made, even when it was
obvious that none would be afforded
and when Mfective retaliation made

time of the essence. Likewise, there
were learned debates on what in any
given context amounted to proportional
response. Finally, there was contention
as to what state acts were illegal in
international law so as to permit taking
reprisals in the first place. 32 Nevertheless, as a general proposition, the rule of
the Naulilaa incident fulfilled the task
of enunciating concepts, with a consensus in state practice, which served to
provide decisionmakers with useful
standards against which to measure their
policies and consequently preserve at
least minimum conditions of order and
restraint in the use of force.
Inlervenlion. This final category of
self-help is the most amorphous of the
three, being more a method of applying
force than a conceptual basis or justification for its use. The legitimacy of
intervention is, by and large, to be
found in other categories of self-help.
Thus in customary law there were interventions in the affairs of other states by
way of reprisal {as in the Naulilaa
incident) or for purposes of self-defense
(as in the Caroline case).
But interventions also occurred when
neither of these bases was present. It has
been noted that on many occasions in
the 19th century the Great Powers
intervened in the affairs of other states
in order to impose the settlement of a
question which threatened the peace of
EUrope. This type of intervention was a
dictatorial interference with the independence of other states. It was only
justified if it was authorized by treaty
or was undertaken to protect nationals
of the intervening state abroad. Beyond
this intervention was based on sheer
power rather than law. 3 3
Additionally, there was some support
for the notion that states could intervene in a foreign state for humanitarian
purposes, i.e., to prevent a state from
commi tting atrocities against its own
subjects, but such support was far from
unanimous. The prevailing view was that
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a state's treatment of its own subjects
was a matter exclusively within its own
jurisdiction. 34 Humanitarian interven·
tion in this context cannot truly be
conceded therefore as a part of positive
customary international law. State practice would seem to have cynically relegated the application of this principle to
those areas of the world considered
un-Christian and uncivilized. 3 5
xxxxxxx
This then was the state of the law of
forcible self-help at the time of the
creation of the League of Nations after
World War 1. Nor was the law significantly affected by the League. While
this organization aspired to shift the
competencl1 to use force to a corporate
body rathef than leaving it with individual states, the focus of the League was
on precluding war rather than forcible
measures short of war, and consequently no prohibition against reprisals
or interventions or limited actions in
self-defense appear in the covenant.
It may well have been that resort to
force, at least by way of intervention or
reprisal, was inimical to the express
obligation in the covenant to settle
disputes by peaceful means. Indeed,
distinguished authority has made this
exact point. 36 But the fact remains that
there were no express prohibitions in
the covenant, and in the only case on
this point submitted by the Council of
the League to judicial review, forcible
self-help was not prohibited.
The case involved a situation wherein
Italy in 1923 bombarded and occupied
the island of Corfu off the coast of
Greece, claiming that the action was a
legitimate reprisal for the murder of an
Italian general by Greek extremists. The
general had been acting as chairman of
tlle Greek-Albanian boundary commission. The League Council presented to a
committee of jurists the following
question:

Are measures of coercion which
are not meant to constitute acts
of war consistent with the terms
of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant when they are taken by one
Member of the League of Nations
against another Member of the
League without prior recourse to
the procedure laid down in those
articles?
The jurists replied:
Coercive measures which are not
intended to constitute acts of war
mayor may not be consistent
with the provisions of Articles 12
to 15 of the Covenant and it is for
the Council, when the dispute has
been submitted to it, to decide
immediately, having due regard to
all the circumstances of the case
and to the nature of the measures
adopted, whether it should recommend the maintenance or the
withdrawal of such measures.
[Emphasis supplied. ] 3 7
The delphic nature of this reply
provided solace for all concerned. It was
interpreted both as prohibiting forcible
reprisals and as not prohibiting them.
Objectively, however, the most that can
be said is that the customary law in
regard to forcible self-help may have
been stripped of some of its old security
by the reply, but it was not changed.
Accordingly, while incidents of forcible
self-help diminished between World War
I and World War II, the law was not
significantly altered from 1900 until the
creation of the U.N. Charter in June
1945. 33

THE U.N. CHARTER AND
FORCIBLE SELF-HELP
Force Prohibited. While the League
Covenant did not significantly affect the
right of states to resort to forcible
measures of self-help short of war, it
did, as noted in previous discussion,
signal a significant shift in the perspective of nations vis-a-vis the application
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of force generally. 3 9 A central corporate authority was viewed as being
better able to insure that the use of
armed force was kept to a minimum.
Unilateral state action was recognized as
rarely based on real objectivity and
frequently subject to national myopia
and even personal whim.
The League of Nations, of course,
died for a variety of reasons not pertinent to this essay, but the notion that
competence to apply armed force
should reside in a central authority did
not die with it. The idea persisted and
found expression again, after World War
II, in the Charter of the United Nations. 40 The drafters of the U.N. Charter,
unlike the drafters of the League Covenant, did not make the mistake of
limiting their\ specific proscriptions to a
condition of war. They chose rather to
proscribe the threat or use of force.
Accordingly, to the extent that proscriptions exist, forcible measures of
self-help are not excepted, at least not
by any narrow process of definition as
was the case under the League Covenant.
Charter Proscriptions. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the charter provides that,
".All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered.,,4 I Having made this positive
pronouncement, paragraph 4 then states
the negative corollary: ".All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.,,4 2
The third relevant provision with
respect to the use of force by states is
found in article 51 of the charter. This
article prescribes the conditions for the
use of force in self-defense. It provides
that:

Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international
peace and security.43
Taken together, it can be argued that
these three provisions present a clear
and straightforward statement with
respect to the use of armed force by
states in international relations. Its use
is prohibited except in the face of an
armed attack, and then the use of force
is permitted only until the Security
Council acts. 44
The charter then goes on to establish
in the Security Council the competence
and capability to employ armed force to
coun teract threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression. Article 42 provides that
when economic, diplomatic, and other
nonforcible sanctions fail, the Security
Council "may take such action by air,
sea or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international
peace and security.,,45 Article 43 in
tum provides that the member nations
will make forces and facilities available
to the Council for this purpose. 4 6
Article 47 even creates a Military Staff
Committee to advise and assist the
Security Council and be responsible
under the Council for the strategic
direction of armed forces placed at its
disposal.
In chapter VIII the charter then
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provides an alternate methodology for
preserving the peace. It recognizes the
existence of regional arrangements and
agencies and notes that these agencies
have competence to deal with "matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. ,,4 7 In addition, regional agencies
may even take enforcement action, but
not without authorization from the
Security Council. 48
Thus the charter has set up a complete scheme for the transfer of the
competence to apply armed force from
individual states to a central supranational authority. When its provisions
are considered \in vacuo, there are lew
instances where forcible measures of
self-help by individual states can be
legitimated. Use of force is prohibited,
therefore forcible reprisals and interventions are prohibited. Self-defense is permitted until the Council acts, but only
in the face of an armed attack; although
when this occurs the party attacked
may be assisted by its allies, since
collective self-defense is recognized.
In short, it has been advanced that
the customary law in regard to forcible
measures of self-help has been virtually
abrogated by the treaty provisions of
the charter. 4 9 This view finds support
in a recent resolution of the U.N.
General Assembly.
In 1970 the General Assembly received a report of a Special Committee
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. The report was
approved and issued as a "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation J\mong States in J\ccordilnce with
the Charter of the United Nations."s 0
The text of the declaration is quite
lengthy, but a careful reading leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the

General Assembly is unquestionably of
the view that the unilateral use of force
by states is limited, under the charter,
to the narrowest possible circumstances.
It is noted that the threat or use of
force "constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations and shall never be employed as
a means of settling international issues."s I There follows, by way of
illustration, a variety of specific situations wherein states are charged not to
resort to force. In the course of these
illustrations specific reference is made
to reprisals and intervention. The declaration notes: "States have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving
the use of force."S 2 With respect to
intervention, it is provided:
No State or group of States has
the right to intervene directly or
indirectly for any reason whatever
in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. Consequently
armed intervention and all other
forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural
elements are in violation of international law. S3
Despite the pronouncements of the
charter and the resolution of the General Assembly, however, if international
law is properly defined as those rules for
the conduct of interstate relations to
which states bind themselves in their
activities, S4 then the best that can be
said for the charter provisions, in light
of state practice since 1945, is that they
represent what the world community
believed the law ought to be rather than
what it is. It is submitted that the
members of the United Nations have
agreed to be bound by the strict charter
limitations only to the extent that the
central authority is capable of filling the
gap left by a state's renunciation of lhe
right to use force in its own interest. 55
Beyond this, while the charter provi·
sions remain as a moral proscription
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against the use of force, they cannot be
said, in actuality, to provide a real test
of its legitimate application in any
particular case. S 6
We must look elsewhere to find
what, if any, real tests exist for the
legitimate use of forcible measures of
self-help. It will be the purpose of the
next section to attempt to elucidate
what that test might be.
FORcmLE SELF-HELP
SINCE THE CHARTER
The Effect of the Charter. Although
the charter does not provide a realistic
statement of what forcible measures of
self-help are presently legitimate, we
cannot simply harken back to the customary rules of international law and
proclaim thc\t these still provide the
appropriate measure, for the charter has
left its mark. Although nations still
employ force against each other, the
thou shalt not philosophy of the charter
has had the effect of negating, to some
extent, general acceptance of the cus·
tomary law rules. With this in mind it
will be useful to reexamine the classical
categories of forcible self-help in an
effort to determine what state conduct
is still generally considered legitimate.
Self-Defense. There is some justifica·
tion for the contention that since 1945
the right of self-defense which has received general acceptance has a content
identical with the right as expressed in
article 51 of the U.N. Charter, i.e., that
it is limited to being exercised only in
the case of armed attack. s 7 The terms
of article 51, or very similar terms, have
appeared in several important multilateral treaties and draft instruments.
Article 3 of the Inter·American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 provided for individual or collective self·
defense in case of an armed attack. 5 t
Again, in the Japanese Peace Treaty,
article 51 of the U.N. Charter is referred
to expressly. 5 9 Also, the Draft Declara-

tion on _Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provided in article 12
that every state has the right of individual or collective self-defense against
armed attack. 6 0
Authoritative publicists also have expressed the view that the right of
self·defense is thus narrowly limited.
They have argued that despite the problems inherent in the restricted view of
this right, to permit any more latitude
than is contained in the wording of
article 51 would be to open the door to
so many abuses as to impose an unacceptable strain on the requirement of
international order. 6 1
At the other end of the spectrum
there is, however, contention that
forcible measures may be legitimately
taken in self·defense whenever national
security is threatened, whether it be by
specific armed attack, threat of attack,
or any other direct or indirect aggression. In this connection Israel has frequently proclaimed that her entire posture is one of self-defense and that all
forcible actions taken are taken on that
basis. In 1966 before the Security Council, the Israeli Representative noted
that: "Whatever we do, whatever our
government decides to do, it is done in
order to defend and protect our national independence and our national
security. ,,6 2 Again in a Security Council
debate in March 1969 it was stated by
the Israeli Representative: "Yesterday's
Israeli action was an act of self-defense .... Israel has been in a state of
self-defense since 1948. It will so remain
until the Arab Governments agree to
end the war waged against Israel and
conclude peace.,,6 3
Also, in the recent India-Pakistan
conflict one of the claims made by India
was that her incursion into East Pakistan was in self-defense. Yet it was
obvious that no attack against Indian
territory was occurring nor was one
threatened_ In her view, her security was
imperiled by the conditions existing in
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East Pakistan and particularly by the
great influx of Bengali refugees into
Indian territory which was depleting her
slender food reserves. 6 4
Additionally, certain publicists have
been interpreted as supporting this
broad view of the right of self· defense.
In contending that all or at least some
of a state's "legal rights" may be defended by force, it has been argued,
rightly or wrongly, that these writers are
really once again equating the right of
self-defense with the right of self-preservation.
Security Council response to claims
that various resorts to force have been
in self-defense has not been particularly
helpful in carving out currently acceptable conditions for the exercise of
this right. It would seem, however, that
the Council, in \general, adopts a restrictive view. 65 In numerous cases it has
denounced Israeli action taken ostensibly in self-defense but where no specific attack was occurring.6 6 Likewise
the Council condemned the actions of
the British against Yemen in 1964. In
that instance the British had carried out
air attacks against Yemen after Yemen
had made a series of attacks on the
South Arabian Federation. The British
argued before the Security Council that
its actions had been in self-defense, but
the Council declined to accept this plea
and condemned the British action as
"incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.,,6 7
In between the two extreme positions discussed above, argument has
raged pro and con across the entire
spectrum of possible limitations on the
right of self-defense, and it is exceedingly difficult to pick a point and say
"here is where the line can safely be
drawn." It is submitted, however, that
wherever the line should be drawn a
considerable body of opinion would
argue that the test of the Caroline case
still presents a generally acceptable set
of limiting conditions for exercising the
righ t of self-defense. 6 3

Under this test a nation is permitted
to use force in self-defense in the face of
either an actual armed attack or in
anticipation of such an attack, provided
there is an instant and overwhelming
necessity to respond. The argument in
support of at least this much selfdefense takes the position that it is
generally consistent with state practice
and that to limit self-defense short of
the anticipatory phase at this time is to
create a condition which is both inadequate and totally unrealistic.
The proponents of this position also
argue that article 51 of the charter,
properly interpreted, permits anticipatory self-defense. Article 51 states
that nothing shall impair the "inherent
right of individual or collective selfdefense" [emphasis supplied], and, the
argument goes, since the inherent right
al ways included anticipatory selfdefense, it remains legitimate under the
charter. In answer to the contention
that the phrase "if an armed attack
occurs" limits the right, it is argued that
this phrase is merely descriptive of a
particular category of self-defense; that
it was desired to underline that the right
of individual, and more especially of
collective, self-defense had not been
taken away in the process of conferring
power on the Security Council to take
preventive and enforcement measures
for the maintenance of peace. 6 9
But whether article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense or not, states have
consistently acted on this basis. Moreover, to limit self-defense to an armed
attack scenario seriously underestimates
the potential of contemporary weapons
systems 7 0 and also discounts even the
possibility that nonmilitary aggression
could achieve a level of coercion comparable in intensity and proportion to
an armed attack. 7 1
R('prisak Of the three categories of
forcible self-help under discussion, the
law of reprisals has probably been most
severely limited since the adoption of
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the U.N. Charter. It has been widely
conceded that this method of self-help
is now generally unacceptable. 72 Thus
states have rarely attempted to justify
their use of force on the grounds of
reprisal. In the Gulf of Tonkin incident
the United States argued that its actions
were taken in self-defense. 7 3 This was
also the contention of the British in the
Yemen raid. Also, Israel has argued that
her forays against the Arabs were actions in self-defense, although there is
little doubt that in the precharter era
many of them would have been characterized as simply reprisal actions.
Notwithstanding that reprisal is not
generally accepted as a legitimate basis
for employing forcible measures of selfhelp, there is some indication that retaliatory action can still be legitimate under
certain circUImjtances. One illustration is
to be found in the Corfu Channel
case. 74
In May 1946 Albanian shore batteries fired without warning on two
British cruisers making passage through
Albanian territorial waters in the North
Corfu Strait. The United Kingdom,
claiming a right of innocent passage,
subsequently (in October of the same
year) sent two British cruisers and two
destroyers through the strait to assert
this right. The crews were at action
stations with instructions to fire back if
attacked. The two destroyers were
mined with a heavy loss of life. Thereafter, the British sent a large minesweeping force into Albanian waters and
found a number of newly laid mines.
Subsequently, the case was referred
to the International Court of Justice.
Albania claimed inter alia that the
British had violated her sovereignty in
steaming through the strait in October.
The court on this issue held for the
United Kingdom. It stated that the
British mission was designed to affirm a
righ t which had been unjustly denied,
and having carried out the action in a
manner consistent with the requirements of international law, the legality

of the measure taken could not be
disputed.
It has been argued that this decision
suggests the proposition that what is in
reality a reprisal action (i.e., a noninnocent passage of an armed force
through territorial waters) may be legitimate if its purpose is to affirm a legal
right against an expected unlawful attempt to prevent its exercise. 7 5 It appears clear from the Court's condemnation of the British for violating
Albanian territorial waters to search for
mines after the destroyers were sunk,
that retaliation simply to obtain redress
for rights already violated cannot be
condoned. 7 6 Nevertheless, the case
would seem to imply that, at least
exceptionally, a state may be legitimately able to use force in other than
self-defense and without reference to
the United Nations in order to secure
the exercise of certain legal rights.
Intervention. In discussing the customary international law with regard to
intervention, it was noted that in many
cases this measure of self-help was legitimate not by virtue of any intrinsic
justification, but rather because it was
simply a method of effecting a legitimate reprisal or of acting in self-defense.
Therefore, insofar as interventions are
premised on these justifications, they
are of necessity limited since the charter
in the same way and to the same extent
that reprisals and self-defense have been
limited.
Beyond this, while states have made
extravagant claims for the legitimacy of
intervention utilizing a variety of justifications, it would seem that there are
only three circumstances where this
type of activity has been generally
accepted: To protect nationals where
intervention is requested in the face of
an external threat and in certain special
cases. 77
The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is illustrative of
the first of these circumstances. In that
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case, during the course of a rebellion,
It would seem, therefore, that where
the Dominican authorities stated that
the threat is external and a state rethey "could no longer control the situaquests assistance a third state may legitition, that American and foreign lives
mately intervene in its behalf. II 4 The
were in desperate danger and that outquestion of whether the threat is exside forces were required."n In reternal, however, can prove in itself to be
sponse to an urgent appeal from the
highly controversial. Thus there was
U.S. Ambassador, 400 U.S. Marines considerable, albeit unjustified, criticism
were put ashore, in the words of Presiof the U.S. intervention in Vietnam on
dent Johnson " ... in order to give
the grounds that, like Hungary, Vietnam
protection to hundreds of Americans
was a case of popular internal uprising
who are still in the Dominican Republic
rather than external threat. lIs Even this
and to escort them safely back to this criticism implies, however, that if in fact
country.,,79
the threat is external, intervention may
The United States was subject to
be legitimately undertaken.
severe criticism for retaining its troops
The third type of circumstance
in the Dominican Republic long after
wherein it would seem states could
any necessity existed for the protection legitimately intervene within the terriof nationals, but its initial actions were
tory of another state are the special
considered justified by many as a matter cases of necessity_
of urgent ne~essity in order to protect
A serious danger to the territory of a
the lives of U.S. nationals. II 0 Protection
state
may arise either as a result of a
of nationals was one of the legitimate
natural
catastrophe in another state or
grounds for intervention in customary
as a result of the other state deliberately
international law. It is submitted, notor negligently employing its natural
withstanding the sentiments of the
resources
to the detriment of the interGeneral Assembly that states have no
1I6
vening
state.
For example, the reser"right to intervene directly or indirectly
voirs of State A on the upper reaches of
for any reason whatever in the internal
a river might be damaged by natural
or external affairs of any other
forces
posing a threat of flooding to
state, " !I 1 that intervention for this purState B on the lower reaches. Again,
pose in the future would be hard to
State A might negligently or wantonly
fault. II 2
flood the territory of State B. In either
The United States and British actions
case,
even publicists who take a limited
in Lebanon and Jordan provide illustraview of a state's right to use force have
tions of the second circumstance in
conceded that intervention would be
which intervention would probably be
acceptable provided the injuring state
generally acceptable. In both cases the
has not provided a timely remedy and
respective governments had requested
the Security Council is immediately
United States and British help to assist
advised. II 7
in repelling attempts at subversion directed from a neighboring state. While
In the foregoing discussion the atthe United Nations was uneasy about
tempt has been made to present a
the activity, neither the United States
conservative estimate of the extent to
nor the United Kingdom was conwhich classic measures of forcible selfdemned for its actions. By way of help are still generally acceptable in the
contrast, the Soviet Union was soundly
world community. This estimate, howcondemned for its armed intervention in
ever, hardly represen ts the full spectrum
Hungary in 1956 for the purpose of of situations in which states hav~ felt
suppressing a popular internal uprequired to use forcible self-help. Acrising. II 3
cordingly, it becomes necessary for
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decisionmakers to know what, if any,
general criteria exist which can be used
to evaluate the legitimacy of the use of
force in the many instances which do
not fit neatly into one of the established
patterns.

SUGGESTIONS FOR
DECISIONl\IAKERS
The Falk Criteria. In light of the
reaction of the Security Council to
specific claims and the General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law and in view of the general
thrust of most authoritative commentary, it is doubtful that state resort to
force will be endorsed in any situation
other than those discussed previously.
This is not to say, however, that all
other resorts to force will be condemned. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence to suggest that state
resort to force in a variety of circumstances, if not applauded, will at least
not be indicted. 8 II The question for
consideration then becomes, under
what specific conditions can resort to
force by states be rendered tolerable?
The one word answer to this question is "reasonableness." But it is not
terribly helpful for decisionmakers to be
told that their conduct will be tolerated
if reasonable. The term is intuitively
acceptable as a measure of conduct, but
it is also extremely vague with reference
to any given circumstances. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to determine what
are the criteria for reasonable state
conduct with respect to the use of
force.
Considerable work has been done by
legal scholars in an effort to delineate
these criteria. One effort in particular is
worthy of evaluation here. Richard A.
Falk has developed a number of criteria
which would seem to be relevant. 1I9
They provide that the burden of persuasion to legitimate the use of force is
on the user; that it must connect its use
of force to the protection of territorial,

national, or political integrity; that a
substantial link must exist between the
provocation and the claim of retaliation;
that a diligent effort must be made to
seek pacific settlement, including recourse to international organizations;
that the use of force must be proportional to the provocation and calculated
to avoid its repetition; that the force
must be directed primarily at military
targets; that the user should make a
prompt explanation of its conduct before the international community; that
the use of force must clearly demonstrate to the target government what
constituted the provocation; that the
user cannot achieve its purpose by
acting within its own domain; that a
search for pacific settlement should be
made, recognizing the interests of the
target state; and that a disposition to
respect the will of the international
community must be evident.
These criteria in general furnish an
excellent summary of practical conditions for legitimately employing forcible
self-help. Some criticism is indicated
however. The fourth criterion requires
that diligent efforts be made initially to
obtain satisfaction by pacific means. It
is submitted that this criterion shou~d
explicitly state that peaceful solution
must be attempted, if possible. Without
specifically indicating this, the impression is left that peaceful settlement
must always be attempted. In given
circumstances such a requirement would
be completely unrealistic.
A more serious criticism of Falk's
effort, however, arises from a consideration of his second criterion. The use of
force is limited only by the requirement
that there be a connection between it
and the protection of territorial, national, or political integrity. It is submitted that requiring nothing more than
a connection raises the distinct possibility that force could be used in such a
way as to be indistinguishable from the
polar position of completely uninhibited behavior. 9o There is always
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some link which can be estC!blished
between a desired use of force and the
broad concepts of national, political,
and territorial integrity. It is necessary
that decisionmakers operate under more
substantial restraints. Accordingly, it is
suggested that resort to force must
presuppose the existence of an imminent and significant threat to the continued existence of a nation's political
independence and territorial integrity.
In a word, there must be a clear and
present danger that unless forcible action is taken, the independence or integrity of the acting state will be seriously compromised.
With these modifications, it is submitted that Falk has enunciated a useful
framework within which decisionmakers
can both evaluate a prospective use of
force and d\!velop methodologies for its
application. It has been argued that this
approach completely ignores the proscriptions of the charter law, 9 1 but this
contention, however, ignores the fact
that international law, to be law, requires consensus and that the only
consensus with respect to the charter
provisions that can be observed from
state pronouncement and practice is
that they represent aspirational principles rather than realistic norms by
which states are presently willing to
abide.
Saying this does not derogate the
U.N. Charter provisions. They are useful
as a fundamental restraint in the sense
that all applications of force start from
the philosophical premise that they are
suspect. However, if it is insisted that
articles 2(3), 2(4), and 51 represent the
"whole law and the prophets" with
respect to the use of force, the result
could be complete lack of inhibition on
the part of states and total abrogation
of even minimum conditions of public
order. Insisting on everything would
probably result in achieving precisely
nothing.
One question remains: Granted that
Falk's criteria, as modified, appear to

provide a framework for evaluating and
managing the use of force, are they in
fact illustrative of actual state practice
which has been accepted by the world
community? Before turning to a consideration of this issue it will be helpful
to summarize and reoJ;der the criteria.
The use of force by states may be
acceptable provided:
• That acts of provocation by the
target state have raised an imminent and
significant threat to the continued existence of a nation's political independence and/or territorial integrity.
• That, if possible, a diligent effort
has been made to obtain satisfaction by
pacific means.
• That recourse to international organizations is had as practicable.
• That a state accepts the burden of
persuasion and makes a prompt explanation of its conduct before the relevant
organ of community review, showing a
disposition to accord respect to its will.
• That the acting state's purpose
cannot be achieved by acting within its
own territory.
• That the use of force is proportional to the provocation and directed
against military and paramilitary targets
and clearly indicates the contours of the
unacceptable provocation.
• That the user of for-ce continues to
seek a pacific settlement of the underlying dispute on reasonable terms.
The Cuban Quarantine. The interdiction by the United States of the intro·
duction of Soviet nuclear missiles into
Cuba provides an outstanding example
of a state using coercion in a manner
generally acceptable to a world community notwithstanding that its use did
not properly qualify as either selfdefense, reprisal, or intervention. 92
It is true that the U.S. actions have
subsequently been criticized by some
publicists. 93 However, in the world
community, objection to the U.S. endeavor at the time was minimal-at least
in the states beyond the sphere of
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Soviet influence. 94 Moreover, the
United Nations itself in no way condemned the United States and many
states specifically affirmed the quarantine. 95
With Falk's modified criteria in
mind, it will be useful to examine the
U.S. action.
At the outset the United States
amassed a body of incontrovertible evidence that the Soviets were in the
process of establishing offensive missile
bases in Cuba. The missiles were capable
of massive destruction throughout the
Western Hemisphere. It was evident that
the Soviet effort was a deliberate attempt to significantly alter the status
quo and could have serious consequences for national and hemispheric
security. 96
With the\evidence in hand and in the
face of a bland assurance from the
Soviet Union that they would never
place offensive weapons in Cuba, the
United States developed a carefully
orchestrated response. 9 7 First it was
determined that the response would
take the form of a naval "quarantine"
rather than a military attack. The
strongest argument against armed attack
was that it would erode, if not destroy,
the moral position of the United States
throughout the world. 98 The quarantine would have some of the incidents
of a blockade 99 but would be limited
initially to interdicting the shipment of
offensive military equipment to Cuba. It
was hoped that this limited coercive
force would produce the desired resuIts. 1 00
Having decided on a course of action,
the United States then sought the support of the Organization of Am.erican
States. The OAS was apprised of the
circumstances of the threat and encouraged to support and cooperate in
the U.S. action. The response was a
unanimous affirmation of the U.S. position, and the OAS resolved to take all
measures necessary to terminate the

threat to -the peace and security of the
hemisphere. 1 01
The OAS resolution was immediately
conveyed to the United Nations. The
President of the United States almost
simultaneously issued the Quarantine
Proclamation and indicated that the
quarantine would go into effect on the
following day. This delay was provided,
inter alia, to allow some time for the
Soviets to divert vessels already at sea
which were carrying prohibited cargoes.
The United States also requested an
urgent meeting of the U.N. Security
Council. 1 02
The backing of world powers was
solicited and obtained. The OAS of
course approved the effort, and the
British, French, and West Germans announced their support. While Soviet
satellite states joined with the Kremlin
in denouncing the U.S. action as piracy,
world opinion generally ratified the U.S.
stand.! 03
The quarantine was prosecuted in a
forceful but carefully controlled manner. The Navy deployed 180 ships into
the Caribbean. The Strategic Air Command was dispersed to civilian landing
fields around the country to lessen its
vulnerability in case of attack. Missile
crews were placed on maximum alert,
and troops were moved into the southeastern part of the United States.! 04
Warnings were broadcast at regular intervals by the U.S. Navy. These indicated that the Windward Passage, Yucatan Channel, and Florida Straits might
become dangerous waters. ! 05
The United States also announced a
"Clearcert" plan. Shippers could obtain,
in advance, a clearance certificate to
send cargoes through the quarantine
area. The purpose of this measure was
to minimize interference with nonoffensive shipping. Concurrently, additional pressures were developed. Major
maritime insurers ceased handling policies for the Cuban trade. Also, Soviet
shipmen ts by air were curtailed when
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nations refused to grant refueling privileges. I 06
The in terception of vessels by the
Navy was to be handled in a most
circumspect manner. If a vessel refused
to stop, the Navy was to shoot at its
rudders and propellers in an effort to
disable the vessel but avoid any loss of
life or the sinking of the ship. 1 07 The
first vessel stopped and boarded was
personally selected by the President. It
was the S.S. Marula, Panamanian owned
and under Soviet charter. The United
States was demonstrating to the Soviets
that it was going to enforce the quarantine, and yet because Marula was not
Soviet owned the boarding did not
represent a direct affront requiring a
response. 1011
Along with the foregoing measures,
the United States maintained constant
communication both with Soviet diplo·
mats and directly with Nikita Khrushchev. The reason for the American
action, its limits, and the conditions for
its termination were made crystal clear.
Efforts were also con tinued in the
United Nations. Every opportunity was
given the Russians to find a peaceful
solution which would neither diminish
their national security nor be a public
humiliation. 109
As is well known, the interdiction
was successful. The missiles were removed and the quarantine was terminated. A serious threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere had been removed by the collective application of
force by the United States and the other
nations of the regional alliance in such a
manner as to be acceptable to world
opinion.
Evaluation. Falk's modified criteria
reflect almost precisely the methodology employed by the United States in
the Cuban incident. Objective evidence
of provocative acts was amassed, and it
became clear that the acts constituted a
significant threat both to the political
independence and territorial integrity of

the United States. 1 1 0 Efforts Vlere
made to peacefully resolve the matter
with the Russians, but these proved
unavailing in the face of their bald
assertions that they were not introducing missiles or other offensive
weapons into Cuba. 111 Having determined to use force, the United States
obtained the cooperation of its regional
organization. Moreover, both the United
States and the OAS immediately informed the United Nations, accepted
the burden of persuasion, and clearly
indicated a disposition to accord respect
to its will. II 2
Obviously the United States could
not achieve its purpose simply by acting
within its own territory, but its interference was not within the territory of
any other nation but rather on the high
seas. Moreover, the response was carefully circumscribed to meet the concept
of proportionality and clearly indicated
that the missile buildup constituted the
unacceptable provocation. 11 J
In this connection, the contours of
the provocation were carefully explained to the Soviets. In a letter to
Khrushchev immediately after the quarantine had been imposed, President
Kennedy stated:
In early September I indicated
very plainly that the United States
would regard any shipment of
offensive weapons as presenting
the gravest of issues. After that
time, this Government received
the most explicit assurance from
your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately that no offensive weapons
were being sent to Cuba.... In
reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those
in this country who were urging
action in this matter at that time.
And then I learned beyond doubt
what you have not deniednamely that all those public assurances were false and that your
military people had set out re-
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cently to establish a set of missile
bases in Cuba.... These activities
in Cuba required the responses I
have announced.
I repeat my regret that these
events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that
your Governmen t will take the
necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.! 14
Finally, throughout the course of the
quarantine the United States continued
its efforts to achieve a peaceful solution
which would be sensitive to the needs of
its adversary. I IS The emphasis was on a
settlement which would enable thp.
Soviets to retreat with grace. This finally was achieved by accepting the
Soviets' proposal that they would withdraw the missiles if we would guarantee
not to invad~ Cuba. IIG
The Falk modified criteria, then,
represent not just a theoretical offering,
but a real and substantial framework for
decisionmaking, one which has been
employed successfully and generally
accepted by the world community. Conversely, where these criteria have been
largely ignored, the use of force by
states has been subject to heavy criticism. Witness the condemnation of Russia for her intervention in Czechoslovakia, I 17 the criticism of the U.S.
reten tion of forces in the Dominican
Republic, and most recently the Indian
invasion of East Pakistan and the overwhelming number of Members of the
United Nations who voted that she
should withdraw. I 18

CONCLUSIONS
As indicated at the outset, the effort
of this essay has been directed toward
those charged with the awesome responsibility of managing the use of armed
force. The need for restraint has been
emphasized, and yet recognition has
been given to the demonstrable fact that
in many situations if a state is going to
preserve its national interests, it must

use force and do so unilaterally or in
concert with its allies, but without
reliance on the generally ineffective
competence of the United Nations.
Accordingly, in fulfillment of what is
considered the legitimate legal function
of enunciating rules of behavior having a
consensual basis, some acceptable remnants of the specific customary laws of
self-help have been discussed and some
general criteria for a rational employment of armed force have been evaluated. It is submitted that these rules and
criteria strike a favorable balance between the need for minimum public
order and the requirement for national
security and therefore have found general acceptance in international relations.
Quite obviously, however, they serve
neither public order nor national security to the extent that many might
wish. Nationalists will perceive a need
for fewer legal inhibitions, and internationalists will generally demand greater
rp.straints on national power. Interestingly enough, upon occasion the converse will also be true. Situations have
arisen, and will continue to arise, where
considerations of humanity will lead
many to demand forcible and even
unilateral intervention in the affairs of a
state, while national self-interest will
perceive no necessity for action and
hence employ the argument that to
intervene would be unjustifiable.
It is this diversity of perception both
in general and in specific situational
hypotheses that makes any attempt to
prescribe rules of behavior hazardous at
best. Is it right or morai or just that the
repression in East Pakistan or the genocide in Biafra should be permitted to
continue simply because it is an internal
affair and the United Nations is powerless to act? Is it reasonable that a stale
should stand by and turn the other
cheek to provocateurs bent on diluting
its national security or threatening its
national interests as in the Dominican
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Republic? Or, for that matter, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia?
The provisions of the U.N. Charter
would seem to answer with a resounding
"yes," if the alternative is the use of
armed force, and it is doubtful whether
even the more liberal criteria which have
been enunciated in this essay would
admit to resort to force under these
circumstances. By way of conclusion, it
might be useful therefore to reflect for a
moment on why this must be so.
Particularly for the powerful nations
of the world, the use of force, un·
restrained by law or regulation, can
become addictive as a method of
settling disputes. It is simpler and much
quicker than the frequently tortuous
routes of negotiation and arbitration,
and in the short run, it is more productive. For the'i>e reasons the use of force,
while initially resorted to for only the
most legitimate of reasons, can rather
quickly become the primary option for
the resolution of any difficulty, whether
it be a reasonable option or not. The
resultant disorder, even putting aside
the current possibility of escalation to
nuclear catastrophe, does not, it is
submitted, in the long run confer a net
benefit on the user of force. The discord
and animosity created by the aggressive
behavior cannot help but prejudice a
state's international relations and longrange interests. Restraint must therefore
be exercised, if only for pragmatic
reasons.
Furthermore, restraint must be exercised in the face of, at least from the
perspective of the prospective user of
force, rather severe provocations. Since
it is impossible to draw lines which will
clearly separate reasonable and unreasonable resort to force in all situations, the law must err on one side or
the other. Here considerations of
morality should come into play. Since
the use of armed force necessarily entails the possibility of loss of life, it is
submitted that the rule of law and the
conduct of nations should clearly sup-

port the view "when in doubt, don't."
Stated more precisely, force should be
resorted to only when it is clearly
reasonable, and even then the quantum
should be strictly proportionate to the
need.
In a way, it is strange that nations
have been so resistant to this conceptualization. Nations are, after all, made up
of individuals, and these individuals
have extensive domestic conditioning in
a rule of law which, by and large,
imposes severe limitations on individual
resort to force. True, there are wellknown and enforceable sanctions for
domestic violations, but it is clearly
evident that the majority of the people
obey the law out of a conviction that it
represents an appropriate course of conduct rather than from fear of retribution. And yet when action is translated
to the international scene, this conditioning has tended to evaporate in favor
of the notion of sovereign independence
knowing no law other than national
interest.
Merely stating this paradox, however,
suggests a solution. It is submitted that
the bulwark of domestic adherence to
the rule of law is the sense of community that a nation has developed over
time. From common history and language and experience there has evolved
a sense of unity which supports accommodation to the needs of others and
restraint in the expression of individual
preferences. Conversely, although the
U.N. Charter reflects a legal posture
which presupposes the existence of such
a sense of community among nations, it,
in fact, does not as yet exist.
With respect to the use of force, the
embryonic international sense of community only admits of the restraints
suggested in this essay, and then not
always. Beyond this, regulation must
proceed at a measured pace, stride for
stride with a developing sense of international community. Decisionmakers
can hardly be expected to assume a
condi tion of international accom-

159
modation which does not exist, but if
resort to force is ever to be eliminated,
they must always be actively aware of
the degree of consensus which has been
achieved. And as
progress is made toward more
effective organization and centralization in the world arena, the
hope that may be ~eld out is that

the set of policies embodying the
restraint of coercion and the
promotion of humanitarianism
may rise in the balance and that
the scope of permissible coercion
may gradually be attentuated and
more exacting standards of
humanity formulated and
applied. 1 1 9
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BELLIGERENCY AND LIMITED WAR
William O. Miller
When J was asked if I would give this
presentation, I wondered if the title,
"Belligerency and Limited War," was
cast in technical legal terms--that is,
does it mean belligerency in its generally
accepted legal sense--and does it mean
"war" in its generally accepted legal
sense--or docs it mean a situation wherc
there is no technical state 0 f war but,
ncvertheless, where therc is a largc-sealc
armed conflict raging.
This is an extrcmely important consideration, for the technical cxistence of
a state of war, in the traditional law, has
been a prerequisite for the legitimacy, in
a legal sensc, of certain types of actions.
For example, the term "blockade" is a
term unknown in the law .except as it
connotes a belligerent blockade in time
of war.
This has always seemed to me to be a
somcwhat less than adcquate manner of
viewing tlw problem. Thc real problem,
it scems to me, is thc nced to dctcrmine
what dC/,'l"ce of forcc, applied in what
manner, against what targets, may states
reasonably expect acceptance by the
majority of other states.
But until just reccntly lhis enlirc
prohlt'lII Il<Is h('(~n approadlt:tI hy allllost
all of OUI" inlernalional law puhlieisls-and, indeed; by thc slates themselves-from thc two polar extrcmes--therc was
a "law of peace" anti there was a "law
of war." Almost all of the major works
in the international law field arc divided
into two parts--one on war, the other on
peace.

What I think we should ask ourselves
in any study of this topic is how much
real utility docs the dichotomy of a law
of war and law of peacc provid(~ to us,
and I think we wiII come up with the
answer that in a contcmporary situation
it provides little utility at all.
Let's take a look just for a minute at
thc situation in Vietnam. \V ar or peace'?
Or docs it rcally maLLer frolll a legal
standpoint?
As a factual matter, what wc have
there is a conflict of major proportions.
But, as we are all aware, there is no
tcchnical state of war in cxistellce. You
have read the memorandum from the
Defense Department to the Senate
Armed Services Committee in which it
was stated that the present situation
imposes no obstacles on us in the
pursuance of our objectivcs in Vietnam,
and I have no doubt that this is true,
But what if our ohjectives should bromlen and it was considered necessary to
restrict the inflow of goods into North
Vietnam? I know you have often heard
it said that we cannot blockade Ilai·
phong because it is not legal, bccause
blockade is legal only in time of war. J
have also hearll it said that the prcsent
coastal surveillance measures by the
South Vietnamese cannot extend beyond 12 miles from their eoast--heyond
their contiguous zone--beeause it is illegal, except in unusual circumstances in
time of peace, to exercise control over
the ships of another state beyond that
limit. Thc effcct of these statements is
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simply that the Republic of Vietnam/
United States cannot insist on helligerent rights beeailse a state of war docs
not l:xisL.
TIll' ('OIlVl'('l\(1 ilia\, havl: IH'ell tnll: ill
tht: Ullited Arab I{ejlliblic's blockm": of
the Israeli port of 1·:lath. Was this
"blockmle" legal or illegal? It depends
on what law you apply-the law of war
or the law of peace. Clearly, I think that
if the U.A.R. possessed belligerent
rights--that is if a slate of war existed
hetween Israel and the U.A.R.-their
actions were legal. It would be to Ihe
contrary, however, if they did not
possess belligerent rights. The hasic position of the United States on this point
was that belligerent rights did not exist
heeause of a 195B Security Council
R(lsolution which stated the prior armistice had ended the war and that neither
liide could lehritimatcly claim helligen:nt
ri~hlli. lIence, it was said, the 1958
Geneva Convention providing for free
passage through international straits was
the controlling rule. The Egyptians, on
the other hand, !lased their position
essentially on the fact that there was,
indeed, a state of war existing, that it
had merely been suspended for a time
hy the armistice, and that they considered it necessary for their security to
prevent inllux of strategic goods. Also,
they very pointedly noted that the 1958
(;mu:va C:onventions were intelult:d to
r(:l-(ulate peacetime, and not wartime,
rcla tio ns.
The point here is that there are such
things as belligertmt rights, rights which
cxist only in a technical state of war.
I\lany today contend that this state of
the law docs not satisfactorily treat the
contemporary situation where we don"t
really have "war" in its traditional and
technical sense, and where we don't
really have "peace," hut where we must
l":al with something in he tween. I have
also heard it said that this war/peace
dichotomy docs not really or effectively
pn:s(:ril,,: a norm of l:oIIIluet for a state.
If OIII:'S nctions are iIIegnl when placed

in the "peace" euhbyhole, legality can
be be:;towed on them hy designating the
situation in which they occur as "war."
While the thrust of this statement
lIlay he true to some uegree, it is, of
course, by no means true that the
uesignation of a conflict as "war" is a
step to be taken merely to legalize some
act; for when one party to a conflict
considers whether it should insist on
belligerent righ'ts, it must also consider a
host of other factors, not the least of
which arc the treaty relations of its
opponent which the existence of a state
of war may bring into play, and most
important by that the exercise of belligerent rights will impose reciprocal restrictions upon neutrals, restrictions
which those neutrals Illay be loath to
aeeepL. lienee, the importance, power,
anu i~lclinations of so·ealleu neutral
powers and the effect that belligerent
restrictions on their normal rights will
have are extremely important considerations.
This can be illustrated by the traditional law of war as it relates to the
belligerent right to embargo sea commerce to and from its enemy--to stop
the flow of goods, both inward and
outward, which enhances the enemy's
warmaking effort.
The particular method for accomplishing this purpose, which I want to
discllss, is tlw traditional or the IH:lligerent hlockade.
Blockade was originally coneeivcd
and executed as the maritime counterpart of siege. It was the total prohibition of maritime communication, inward or outward, with a uesignateu
portion of the enemy's coastline. Its
foclIs was, and is, on ships, unlike the
law of contrabanu where the focus is on
cargo. Blockaue is ucfined as the belligerent right to prevent vessels of all states
from entering or leaving specified ports
or coastal areas which arc under the
sovereignty, occupation, or control of
the enemy. This could include tllll
whole 0 f th e enemy coastline, as indeed
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it did during the American Civil War
when the Union forces maintained a
blockade of the entire Confederate
coas!.
Blockade, by its nature, involves not
only illler[erellee with vessels flying the
enemy's flag, but also with vessels flying
the flag of neutral states. One of the
most fundamental considerations in
blockade is that it applies to belligerent
and neutral vessels alike; hence, one of
the restrictions of neutrals which I
mentioned a moment ago, restrictions
Oil
a state's otherwise legally unrestricted right to trade with whomsoever it wishes. Neutral states, therefore,
traditionally insisted that the enforcement of a blockade must be in accordance with strict and clear rules, the
first of which being that the blockade
must be enforced impartially against
ships of all states. If ships of some states
are permitted through and those of
others are not, then a blockade in its
lcgal sense may not be said to exist. The
Unitcd States used this point as basis for
its strenuous objcctions in thc British
blockade of Gcrmany in World War I
which significantly interfercd with U.S.
trade to German ports but did not
restrict Scandinavian trade to these
same ports.
The blockading state must co Inmence the blockade with notification to
all nations as to when the operation is
to begin and the area to be affeded. In
this latter regard the bloekadc must not
be so designed as to bar access to, or
departure from, neutral ports or coastlines. This was intended to ensure that
the blockade docs not interfere with
strictly neutral trade.
Next, the blockade must be effective.
That is, it must be maintained by
sufficient force to make blockade running hazardous, and it must involve a
high degree of risk. The blockade of the
Confederate coast, which I mentioned,
was contested on this ground by some
neutral SUltcs whose vessels were apprcIWI\(led. The blockaded coastlilll: was

ahout 3,000 milcs in length, and there
were only about 4·5 Union ships patrolling the area. As a consequence, many
blockade runners managed to gct
through. NeverthcIess, the U.S. Supreme
Court had little difficulty in determining that the blockade was effective,
so as to make legal the condemnation in
prize of the ships which were captured.
Breach of a blockade occurs when a
vessel, having knowledge of the blockade, passes through or attempts to pass
through it en route to or from the
blockaded area.
The penalty for breach, or attcmpted
breach, is the confiscation of both the
ship and its cargo, whether contraband
or not.
I emphasize here that the liability of
the blockade runner is to capture, and
condemnation is the prize. The blockade runner could not be destroyed
unless she resisted or fled, and unless
destruction was necessary.
What I have just described is the
traditional, or close-in, blockade. This
does not mean that the hlockade force
must be disposed close-in to the enemy
coastline or port, but it docs mean that
the blockading force must be so deployed that neutral vessels bound for
neutral ports wiII not have to pass
through the blockade line, and thus
subject themscIves to being boarded and
searched, and possibly seized for a
blockade breach. This highlights one of
the basic problems of the traditional
blockade in modern times-the deployment of the blockading force close-in to
the blockaded area may be impossible
from an operational viewpoint, and geographical considerations make it impos·
sible, in most regions, to blockade further at sea and not interfere with
innocent neutral shipping or bar access
to neutral ports.
Accordingly, we have seen in modern
warfare the almost total disuse of the
traditional blockade. While there were
some minor close-in blockades during
World War I, nonc were of ,IllY fI'al
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significance; and World War Il rcportcd
only one incident of its use--the Soviet
blockade of the Finnish coast in 1940.
Thcre wcrc, of COllr:;l', blockade:; of a
type during both World War I and World
War 11, but these were not blockades in
the traditional ser se, and they were
never sought to be justified as such.
They were frequently referred to as
long-distance blockades since they involved elosing and patrolling large areas
of the high seas, hundreds of miles from
the enemy's coastline. In both wars the
British blockades of Germany consisted
principally of controlling the northern
and southern approachcs of the North
Sea, thereby restricting access to some
neutral ports as well as German ports.
And the Germans, as you know, by the
usc of war zones blockaded the whole
of the British Isles. Both sides employed
new wcapons for the enforcement of
these long-distance blockades. Where in
prior wars the surface man-of-war was
the weapon utilized for commerce control, belligerents now supplemented the'
surface fleets with the submarine, the
aircraft, and the mine. War zones were
established by all belligerents through
which passage was prohibited or restricted and made extremely dangerous
by a combination of these weapons.
Thus, large areas of the seas were mincd
by the British, Germans, and later by
the United States; mill neutral shipping
was cautioncd to stay out and wcrc told
that if they desired to pass through the
area on an innocent voyage, to funnel
through eertain designated areas where
inspection of their eargo eould be facilitated.
As another method of control, the
British established a system of issuing
"navieerts" to neutral vessels transiting
the blocka{)ed area en route to neutral
ports. Under this system a vessel, legitimately engaged in neutral trade, could
obtain. a naviccrt at its port of last
loading which atLested to the innocence
of its cllrgo anci destination. Upon
n'lIching t h(' hlockllliccillrt!a, till! neutral

vcssel wOl~hl be allowcd to pass unhiJlllercd'- Similarly, a neutral ship ou tbound from a neutral port from within
tlw hloekaded arell could ohtllin a navicert aLLe:;ting to the lIollelwmy origin of
its (:argo. This systcm had the effect of
greatly facilitating the enforcement of
the British blockade and, lit the same
time, minimizing delays in such neutral
trade as the British were willing to
permit.
Let me just summarize thc thrce
principal departures from the traditional
rules which characterized the blockadcs
of both sides in both World War J and
World War H:
1. L~stablishmcnt of war zoncs in
largc areas of the high scas, rcstricting
acccss to ncu tral ports and making
transit through thesc zones dangerous
by thc usc of mincs, submarines, and
aircraft: wcapons systcms which wem
unable to exercise the traditional
method of blockade control--eapture of
the blockadc runner.
2. Therefore, subjecting ships attempting to pass to destruction rather
than capture and condemnation in
prize, as the penalty for breach or
atLempted breach of the blockade; and
3. Ahnost total control of, instead of
minimal intcrferenee with, bona fide
neutral comml'rec.
I want to point out again that thrse
actions were never supported, in a Icgal
sense, under the traditional law of
blockade. They were justified, rllther,
undcr the law of reprisals as actions
which, although iIIegal, are rendercd
legal by virtue of a prior unlawful act of
the enemy. Whatever the legal justification, the real significance of this action
lies in the fact that these departures
from the old rules were made not just
011 occasions but persistently throughout the major wars by all participallts.
Thus, I would say the old rules, by this
course of conduct, were shown to have
lost their validity as law, if we mean by
law a standard of conduct to which we
can expect general community allhcr-
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ence. Many contend, however, that
these departures from the old rules must
be viewed strictly in their reprisal conl('xl ml(lthal as slII'l1 tlwy merely reflect
the operation of sanctions for tlw iIIcl!al
conduct of lhc opposing hclligerent and
that hence they can obtain no color of
legality except as such.
Professor Lauterpacht, however,
states what I think is the better view in
this manner:
Measures regularly and uniformly
repeated in successive wars in the form
of reprisals and aiming at the economic
isolation of the opposing belligerent,
must be regarded as a development of
the latent principle of blockade, namely tlmt the belligerent who possesses
effective command of tile sea is entitled to deprive his opponent thcreof
for tllC purpose eitlICr of navigation by
his own vessels or of conveying on
neutral vesscls such goods as are dcstined to or originate from him.

In other words, new condilions have
demandcd new laws, and thcy should
have them. This was seen at the outset
by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, who has been
referred to as the father of German
submarine warfare. lie said this in his
memoirs:
Had we dealt ,vith the submarine
campaign eooly and consistently, wc
should have prepared thc ground for
the view that the campaign was not
mcrely justifiable as a reprisal against
thc starvation blockadc (which, unfortunately, waS lIw (lilly argulIII'lIt put
forward on our behalf), but that it was
clearly and irrefutably justificd by tile
maritime law created by the English
themselves at tile beginning of the war.
The new weapon could not be bound
by tile rules made in tile old sailing
days of a ecntury ago, but had a right
to a new law. Docs anyone seriously
believe that in any future war a people
fighting for its life will not use the
submarine as we have used it in this
war, evcn if the rules of international
law forbid them to do so.

The point I want to make here, and,
indeed, in this entire prcsentation, is
that wi'th the broadening scope of a
hclligcrcnt's ohjectivcs--in hoth Worlel

Wars, the total subjugation of the
encmy--and with the development of
new wcapons through which these objcctives can he sought, a ncw look is
rcquired at thc Icgal framework hy
which the world cOlllmunity sceks to
regulate the conflict. Given, then, a
legitimate military objcctive-and ccrtainly, in modcm warfarc, commerce
which strengthens the enemy's war effort can be a legitimate military objective--we must expect those measurcs to
be used which can effectively restrict
that commerce and which the belligerent has at hand. Any legal system
which does not adequately deal with the
practicalities of the situation will be just
as ineffective as the old blockade rules
were in the two preccding major wars.
These rules on blockadc were simply
not sufficiently realistic as to compel
general adherence in either of these
giant conflicts. So, it seems to me that
in this context of all·out war, they were
shown to have lost their status as law.
Now I do not mean that these
principles have totally lost their usefulness for, perhaps, we can envision a
situation where we could expect to sec
general adherence to them.
A small war, betwecn smaller states,
where political objectives remain well
limited and where the geographical
situation is appropriate ma), very well
sec an old traditional type blockmle. As
a maLLer of faeL. wc saw sOJllething akin
to this in the Egyptian blockade of the
Israeli port of Elath. I say "akin" to the
traditional blockade because the U.A.H..
emphasis was not on shipping but on
strategic goods. That is to say, Egypt
did not bar all shipping through the
Straits of Tiran, but only harred items
of strategic goods. She announced that
all Israeli shipping, of course, would be
fired upon, but that neutral shipping
would be required to stop for inspection
of their cargo and that any attempt by a
neutral to ship strategic goods to Israel
would be considercd an unfriendly act
against all Arah slales.
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Thl'n' al:;o was a tr;lIlitional hloek;lIle
hy the United States ap;ainst the North
Korean coast tluring the Korcan war
whcm then' was a fm mahle p;cohrraphic
situation and liJlli ted political objcctivcs. This hlockade, according to
l\lessrs. Cagle and Manson, was successfully maintained for 3 years. And, yes,
hoth Soviet and Chinese Communist
vessels respected the hlockade, although
hoth governments denounced it and
refused to recognize its legality or even
its existence.
I would like now to discuss three
other, but related, situations with you.
The first is the old 19th century
concept of pacific blockade--a term
which one hears handied ahout from
time to time. This action has heen
deserihed as a measure short of war, i.e.,
where the hlockading slate docs not
wish to resort to war but, nevertheless,
wishes to resort to some degree of force
to ohtain redress of a claimed wrong hy
the opposing slate. Hence, pacific blockades arose as a form of reprisal used in a
peacetime situation generally by larger
states against those less powerful. It
consisted of hlockading aeecss to or exit
from a particular port or ports of the
target state, of the vessels of that state.
Only the shipping of the blockaded
state was affected. Neutral ships, or
ships of other nations, an~ permiLled to
C()ml~ mill go i1S they please. There are
no rc(:orclcd iw;Lancl:H of this "eing IIHI:(\
in this century, and there arc no instances where it was ever used by the
United States. I mention it here just so
that you will be able to distinguish it
from the belligerent type blockade if
the need arises.
There arc other measures short of
war which hear some relevance to the
use of seapower in a limitcd war situation. I refer to the basic right of every
staLe to take such actions at sea as are
reasonable and necessary to protect its
security interest against the hostilc acts
of oLher states. The old case of the U.S.
Flagship I';r#;/I ilL.~ is fl"~II'u:ntly eitell in

supporL of this proposiLion. This ship
was seized hy the Spanish authorities in
LB7;~ while it was in the proce:;s of
transporting arms to Cuhan insllrgcnts.
The British ship J)eerholLllcl was seizcd
by Spanish warships during the Spanish
Civil War for the same reason. And
during the Algerian War, French warships stopped at leasl lWo ships--one a
British and one a Yugoslav, both of
which were suspected of the same offense.
The current Market Time operations
in Vielnam arc also pertinent to our
discussion. The Republic of Vietnam
decree announcing this operation Slated,
essentially, that the entry into South
Vietnam of goods or personnel through
other than recognized ports is forbiddcn
by the South Vietnamese customs and
immigration regulations and that it was
intended to enforce these regulations
strictly. Accordingly, it providcd thal all
vessels within the Repuhlic of Vietnam
contiguous zone were subjcct to visit
and search, and arrest where appropriate, for violations of these regulations. It wenl a bit further and declared
that even beyond their contiguous zone,
ships suspected of being RVN, although
flying another flag, would be stopped,
searched, and seized if appropriate.
South Vietnam has done nothing
here, of course, that a state cannot
legally do in time of peace under the
19!iB Geneva Conventions. These are
stricLly police measurcs designed to enforce the domestic laws of the RVN
seaward throughout their sanitnry,
fiscal, amI customs ZOlle, or contiguous
zone, and Oil lhe high seas against ships
suspected of heing their own although
flying a foreign flag.
!VIay I simply pose this question to
you? Does the Virgin ills case, alHl the
others I cited a moment ago, suggest a
ralionale for a possible extension of this
surveillance?
A fi nOlI blockade-type situation
which c(lInpds ollr attention is t he IIH:j
lJuaranlinr of stratep;ie arllls to Cuba.
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This exercise of force at sea was designed by the United States as a response to the Soviet/Cuban missile
thn!at and, el'rtainly, as a IIH:asure
whieh, it was hoped, eould re:mlve the
situation short of aetual conflict.
I call this a blockade-type situation
because it was not a blockade in any
sense of the word--you will recall that I
commenced my remarks with the notation that blockade deals with ships,
solely, and not their cargo.
There was never any intention in the
Cuhan situation to prevent the ingress
of ships. The entire thrust of the operation, of course, was on offensive missiles
and their component parts. Ships were
stopped, and those whieh were not
transporting the prohibited items were
permitted to eontinue their voyage, and
a clearcert, or clearance certi ficate,
system, modeled a fter the old naviccrt
system was initiated to obviate even this
ineonvenience for ships carrying innocent cargo. This really bears a close
resemblance to the prohihition of contraband, also a belligerent right under
the traditional law of sea warfare. Bear
in mind here that there never was any
intention, on anyhody's part, that a
state of war should exist between the
United States and Cuba, or the United
States and the Soviet Union, although
what has traditionally been a helligerent
right was, in essence, exercised.
This, I thillk, delllollHLraLC:K Illy tlH:His
thaL changing conditions require changing rules and that a law of peace and law
of war dichotomy is inadequate in such
eonLclllporary situaLions.
Clearly, the UniLed States could have
declared war Oil Cuha, established a
hlockadc, or annolillced lists of contraband itcms; although, undoubtedly,
many would have cried that the declaration of war, itself, was violative of
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. But
putting this argument aside for a :noment. it el'rtainly l:'Cl'IllS obvious that a
forIllal statc of war sh()uld not be
reljuired for a state to insist on certain

essential protecLive rights since such
would have undoubtedly prejudiced Lhc
chances for a peaceful solution of the
matter.
Of course, the lawyers have waxed
long and hard on the legality of the
quarantine. Some puhlicists, cvcn some
U.S. publicists, have branded it as an
unlawful exercise of force under article
2(4) of the Charter. Others, and these
are substantially in the preponderance,
have argued for its legality, although not
always using the same yardstick. The
official U.S. position is that the action
was legal as a collective action by the
American states under articles 6 and 8
of the Rio Treaty in response to a
situation endangering the peace of
America. Others contend that it was a
legitimate exercise of the right of collective self-defense undcr article 51 of the
U.N. Charter.
These latter arguments seem to me to
he the more realistic ones and, as such,
to he a much more useful part of the
continuing development of standards of
conduct to which we can generally
expect states to conform. To brand as
illegal under present law every exercise
of armed force, as some do, invites
comments like those of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the
American Society of International Law,
shortly after the quarantine.
I must concludc that the propriety
of the Cuban quarantinc is not a h:gal
issue. Thc powcr, position, and prestige
of the United States had been challenged by another statc: and law
simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power-·power that
comes close to the sources of sovereignty. I cannot believe that there arc
principles of law that say we must
aeccpt destruction of our way of life.
One would be surprised if practical
men, traincd in legal history and
thought, had devised and brought to a
state of gencral acceptance, a principle
condemnatory of an action so cssential
to the continuation C(f precmincnt
pOWl'r as that taken by the United
Statcs last Octobl'r. Such a principle
would bc as hannful to the devdoll'
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ment of restraining procedures as it
would be futile. No law can destroy
thr state creating the law. The survival
of states is not a matter of law.

Whether or not 01\(: ahrrecs fully with
th($e n'lIIl1rks, I do I hink onl! must
abrrl!e that they do point out c1eurIy that
in order for restruining procedures to
huve any hope of effectiveness, they
must be premised on a realistic appraisal
of what states can be expected to do in
particular circumstances.
Now, what is the relevance of all of
this to my subject--the legality of the
use of certain weapons in a limited war
situation?
.
While we do have some rules of
international law in sea warfare which
appear definite and certain on their
face, this is by no means the true
situation. I\lost of these ;ulcs were
d1w(·I0l'l·tI in allll for a totally tliffl'rent
(mvirolllnent than we face today. While
there are, and must be, restraints on the
participants in a conflict, whether or
not that conflict is characterized as a
technical state of war, I think history
teaches us that the degree of effective
restraint will vary in inverse proportion
to the nature of the objectives for which
tJle conflict is being waged; that is, as
the objectives become more unlimited,
the fewer restraints we can expect the
parties to impose upon themselves, und,
hence, the fewer constraints the world
community, in the form of law, can
hope to impose.
The traditional blockade which we
have been discussing provides a good
example of this. When faced with a war
where the total, organized resources of
thc enemy became a legitimate military
objective, the old rules which sought to
separate noncombatants from combatants at sea were not adequate. Nor
were those which failed to make allow-

anees for the effect which otherwise
normal neutral trade would have on the
enemy's war effort. Thus the old 19th
century law failed under the strict test
of mili~ary necessity in a modern context.
But to get back to my subject, I will
simply say that in limited war situations, where objectives are limited, there
will be more self-imposed restraints and,
hence, more constraints in the form of
law that can hope to be imposed:
In the Vietnamese situation, for example, our self-imposed restraints arc
such that we make no effort at all to use
force to interfere with the seaborne
trade into North Vietnam.
This situation Iilight very well be
otherwise, however, if there were to be,
for example, a massive invasion across
the DMZ. It could very well be that the
defense of South Vietnam would require interdiction of North Vietnamese
strategic commerce. This situation did
develop in Korea. It would not be
unrealistic, therefore, to expect, given
the right circumstances, something in
the nature of a traditional blockade of
the North Vietnamse coast.
In seeking to determine the legality
of a proposed action, one should not
only look to such rules as are found in
such publications as The Law of Naval
Warfare, but he must also study the
history of these rules, i.e., the situation
for which they were designed and the
history of their application. lIe must'
also recognize that there are many
situations which are simply not covered
in the rule books--and it is here, particularly, where the practice of states, if it
can be determined, will make possible a
hetter and more meaningful appraisal.
As Professor Morgenthau stated the
other day, "We deal not with theory,
but with experience."
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